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The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy 
  
Patricia Justino 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
This paper offers a framework for analysing the effects of armed conflicts on households and 
the ways in which households in turn respond to and cope with the conflicts. It distinguishes 
between direct and indirect effects, and shows that the indirect effects are channelled 
through (i) markets, (ii) political institutions, and (iii) social networks. Drawing upon the recent 
empirical literature, the paper portrays the processes running along these various channels 
and offers policy suggestions to be adopted at both national and international levels. 
 
Keywords: armed conflict; civil conflict; household welfare; transmission mechanism; coping 
mechanism; remittances. 
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Introduction 
 
Armed civil conflicts carry various direct and indirect costs which strongly affect the living 
conditions of households at the time of the conflict and for many years thereafter. Civil wars 
and violent insurrections kill and injure millions of people every year. They destroy 
infrastructure, services, assets and livelihoods, displace populations, break social cohesion, 
institutions and norms and create fear and distrust. Fearon and Laitin (2003) calculate that 
civil wars have resulted in three times as many deaths as inter-state wars between states 
since World War II. Most households affected by armed conflict live in poor countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Stewart et al. 2001a, 2001b), in 
conditions of extreme destitution, poverty and misery. Armed civil conflicts are likely to add 
new forms of vulnerability and exclusion, which in turn may feed into future outbreaks of 
violence even after the initial conflict has subsided.  
 
The impact of economic shocks, such as price changes, sudden climatic changes, loss of 
work or illness, on household welfare is the subject of an extensive literature in development 
economics.1 The impact of political shocks caused by the outbreak of armed civil conflicts is 
much less well understood. Recent empirical literature has begun to document the 
substantial costs that armed conflicts impose on the countries and communities involved 
(Collier 1999; Hoeffler and Reynal-Queirol 2003; Knight, Loayza and Villanueva 1996; 
Lindgren 2005). Those costs encompass the most immediate and observable consequences 
of war like damages to the national productive structure and the redirection of resources from 
productive to military uses, as well as the potential impact on the future production capacity 
of a country (via capital flights and emigration of skilled labour force). Considerable effort has 
also been put in to estimating mortality rates in conflict situations (Ball, Tabeau and Verwimp 
2007; de Walque 2004; Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2005; Tabeau and Bijak 2006), as well as 
the incidence of poverty (Goodhand 2003). Comparatively less attention has been devoted to 
the estimation of the effects of violent conflicts on household welfare. This is to a large extent 
due to a paucity of useful, reliable data that enables researchers to explore the relationship 
between armed conflict and household welfare in a rigorous fashion that goes beyond either 
discussions of state agency or broad macro analysis.2 
 
Armed civil conflict is wide-ranging term, which designates a variety of political phenomena 
including, amongst others, insurrections, revolutions, rebellions, coups and wars. The image 
it most commonly brings to mind is that of civil war, which in itself is still a conceptual black 
box (see Kalyvas 2007 for discussion). Civil wars have attracted the attention of many 
scholars in recent years (see, amongst others, Appadurai 1999; Brown 2001; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2001, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr and Moore 1997; Luckham 2004; 
Sambanis and Elbadawi 2002; Singer and Small 1994). Most of these studies focus on the 
state or state institutions as the main actors/targets of armed conflict, while the micro 
foundations of armed conflict remain ill-understood. Micro level analyses of armed conflict 
are uncommon albeit the fact that, at a fundamental level, civil conflict originates from 
individual behaviour and their interaction with immediate surroundings, social groups and 
institutional norms. Furthermore, all forms of armed conflict mould individual and household 
behaviour in forms that will have significant implications for policies aimed at the resolution 
and/or prevention of armed conflict. This highlights another neglected dimension of armed 
conflict in research studies – its endogeneity rooted in household behaviour. This particular 
                                                 
1  On the impact of trade shocks on household poverty dynamics see McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) and Winters 
(2001). On the impact of weather shocks see, for instance, Paxson (1992) and Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993). 
Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2003) and Lokshin and Ravallion (2005) examine the micro-level impact of financial 
crises. Gertler and Gruber (2002) provide empirical evidence on the impact of illness shocks on households’ livelihoods.  
2  Significant, even if infrequent, evidence-based studies have slowly started to surface prompted by recent research 
programmes funded by the Leverhulme Trust at HiCN (www.hicn.org), the European Commission at MICROCON 
(www.microconflict.eu) and the Department for International Development at CRISE (www.crise.ox.ac.uk). 
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characteristic makes armed conflict very different from other shocks, and requires a sound 
understanding of not only the mechanisms whereby conflict impacts on household welfare, 
but also what coping strategies household adopt, as these will impact on the likelihood of 
resolving the conflict and bringing about sustainable peace.3  
 
This paper sets out to provide a framework to analyse these endogenous processes. The 
paper focus on the household impact of violence that results from ‘armed combat within the 
boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity between parties’ (Kalyvas 2007: 17).4 The term 
household in this paper designates civilian non-state actor. Armed combat will affect 
households – both living in areas of combat or in areas where direct combat does not take 
place but are indirectly affected by the fighting – through the intensity and types of violence it 
sets in motion.5 This simple insight allows us to operationalise the analysis of processes of 
armed conflict at the level of the household. As pointed out very clearly by Stathis Kalyvas 
(2007), it is important to distinguish between the concepts of violence and civil conflict. While 
civil conflict represents a political process of negotiation or contestation of sovereignty, it is 
the process of generation of violence by the different factions (against each other and as a 
form of control of territory, resources and populations) that shape household behaviour and 
changes in household behaviour during and after the conflict. The violence that results from 
armed combat can affect directly certain households (for instance, those that supply fighters 
to different armed factions or household that are directly targeted by acts of violence). It can 
also affect households in both combat and non-combat areas through changes in economic, 
social and political institutions. These changes will impact on household welfare through a 
complexity of inter-related channels. Armed combats are rarely one-off shocks and often 
result from slower, structural processes of social transformation. They occur in non-linear 
cycles, where conflict and peace do not represent opposite ends of a continuum, but rather 
coexist in different degrees of intensity in different time periods. Individuals and households 
living in conflict settings6 often find themselves responding, acting and being affected by 
stages in between and must therefore adapt their livelihoods and build coping strategies to 
(re)build their social, economic and political capital accordingly.  
 
The overall goal of this paper is to propose a framework to analyse the dual-causal 
relationship between armed conflict and household welfare. The paper is divided in four 
sections. The first discusses key transmission mechanisms linking armed conflict to 
household behaviour, by identifying household-level variables that are shaped by conflict 
processes. The section provides an analysis of direct impacts of civil conflict on household 
welfare, as well as more indirect effects through changes in institutions, economic growth 
and distribution channels. The second section explores ways in which households respond to 
changes in their own characteristics and surrounding institutions, i.e. what coping strategies 
are undertaken by households affected by armed conflict. The third section looks at policy 
responses (by local and national governments and the international community) in post-
conflict settings and discusses their effectiveness in establishing sustainable peace. The final 
section summarises the findings and discusses ways forward.  
                                                 
3  The occurrence of armed conflict in past is the greatest predictor of a civil war taking place in any given country (see 
Collier et al. 2003; Collier 2007)  
4  Stathis Kalyvas goes on to specify that these parties are ‘subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities’ 
(p. 17).  
5  Kalyvas (2007) offers a theoretical and empirical study of violence in civil war. The notion of violence used in this paper 
is broader that that used by Kalyvas, who defined violence in civil war as ‘intentional physical violence against non-
combatants that takes the form of homicide, in a context where at least one actor seeks to control the population’  
(p. 31). In this paper, violence is understood as physical and psychological harm to household members affected by civil 
war (combatants and non-combatants alike), independently of the objective of specific acts of violence. The analysis of 
the impact of armed conflict on household welfare would obviously be enriched by an effort to unpack types and 
objectives of violence that take place as a direct and indirect result of armed combat. This is outside the scope of this 
paper, but the topic of another research paper in progress by the author. 
6  In this paper the terms ‘armed combat’ and ‘armed conflict’ will be used interchangeably.  
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1  The impact of armed civil conflict on 
household welfare 
 
Individuals and households in developing countries face severe economic risks even in the 
absence of armed conflict (see Dercon 2004 for discussion). Insecure socio-economic 
environments force vulnerable people into deprivation and distress. Outbreaks of armed 
conflict are likely to increase insecurity further. These are typically associated with the 
destruction of essential infrastructure and social services, the breakdown of the rule of law, 
as well as with significant reductions in private and public investment. Armed conflicts kill and 
displace populations, often limiting the access of households to employment and earnings 
(due, for instance, the death or recruitment of young adult males) and increasing levels of 
instability and loss of trust. This situation can be aggravated once displaced and refugee 
populations and demobilised combatants return to their communities in post-conflict 
situations, particularly when food aid and medical help (at least for those that were in refugee 
camps) may no longer be available. Conflict, and subsequent times of insecurity and fear, 
may impact on the ability of individuals and households to fall back on known survival 
strategies. In poorer, more vulnerable areas, or amongst the poorest, more vulnerable 
households, these consequences of conflict will add to already difficult circumstances. Those 
that were not poor may well become so due to reductions in food security following market 
disruption, increased difficulties in getting to markets to sell and buy goods, and the loss of 
earnings capacity, savings and formal and informal risk-sharing networks. 
 
This section discusses the main channels through which conflict shocks are transmitted to 
household welfare. This discussion does not intend to be an exercise in measuring the costs 
of armed conflict, but rather proposes a framework to think systematically about important 
channels through which armed combat impacts households (civilian non-state actors) living 
in conflict settings (for analysis of costs of conflict see Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). These 
channels are illustrated in Figure 1.1 (see over),7 and include both direct and indirect effects 
of armed conflict.  
 
Direct effects of armed conflict on the household (represented by the dotted line in Figure 
1.1) include changes in household composition due to killings, injuries and recruitment of 
fighters by either the government or the rebel groups, changes in the household economic 
status due to the direct destruction of assets and effects caused by forced displacement and 
migration. Indirect effects (represented by the full lines in Figure 1.1) include changes in 
households’ surrounding institutions and environments such as changes in social networks, 
changes in access to or destruction of exchange and employment markets and changes in 
local and national political institutions.  
 
In addition we consider important indirect effects of armed civil conflict on household welfare, 
transmitted through two key macroeconomic variables: economic growth and distributional 
channels. We conclude the section by examining the important long-term effect of armed 
conflict on poverty traps, an extreme form of household welfare loss. The discussion 
introduced in this and in the next section does not intend to take into account every possible 
outcome of armed conflict. Its main aim is to provide a framework to think about key, albeit 
largely ignored, endogenous interactions between micro level processes of armed conflict 
and household behaviour.  
                                                 
7  This section draws on Justino (2006b). 
 9 
 
Figure 1.1 The main channels through which conflict shocks are transmitted to household welfare 
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1.1 Direct impact of armed conflict on household welfare 
 
Household welfare is affected by a myriad of factors and it is often very difficult to isolate the 
impact of one specific shock. Effects may depend on each household’s initial welfare position 
(e.g. initial asset endowments will determine the household’s capacity to respond to 
economic slowdown or reduced market access), but are also related to households’ specific 
characteristics that may make them more prone to being a target of violence, being recruited 
into fighting units or being forced to leave their area of residence (e.g. belonging to a specific 
ethnic group, owning targeted land holdings or property). These effects are unpacked below. 
 
1.1.1 Changes in household composition 
Violent conflicts kill and injure civilians and combatants alike and cause severe psychological 
damage to those involved in fights, to those living in war-torn communities and to displaced 
populations. The levels of mortality and morbidity associated with armed conflict are 
explained not only as outcomes of fighting but are also for the most part the result of 
spreading disease and malnutrition (see Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2006; Coghlan et al. 
2003). Armed civil conflicts are highly correlated with increases in infant and maternal 
mortality rates, larger proportion of untreated illnesses and reduction in nutritional levels, 
even when these are not directly caused by the initial conflict (e.g. WHO 2002). For instance, 
Verwimp and van Bavel (2004) show that although refugee women tend to have higher 
fertility rates than other population groups, their children (girls in particular) have a much 
lower probability of survival due to the health and socio-economic conditions experienced in 
refugee camps. These effects are often aggravated by a variety of factors, even after the end 
of the initial conflict. These include the breakdown of health and social services (which 
increase the risk of disease transmission such as HIV/AIDS; particularly in refugee camps), 
decrease food security (possibly resulting in famines), increase insecurity in living conditions 
and the loss of social capital and political trust (Grein et al. 2003).  
 
There is, however, surprisingly little knowledge on the health consequences of violent 
conflict. Some institutions such as the Médicines Sans Frontières have conducted localised 
field surveys. But in general research on health issues in conflict areas is associated with 
great difficulties due to limitations to the movement of researchers, the destruction of 
registration systems and the possible misrepresentation of politicised information on the true 
levels of mortality and morbidity (see Grein et al. 2003). The direct impact of armed conflict 
on mortality and morbidity is further clouded by the simultaneous proliferation of malnutrition 
and epidemics in fighting areas and in refugee and IDP camps due to food shortages and 
living under unsanitary conditions. Though research is sparse, major advances have been 
made during the past decade in the way the international community responds to the health 
consequences of complex emergencies. In particular, epidemiology has become an 
important tool for assessing health impacts during and after natural disasters and complex 
emergencies (see Coghlan et al. 2003; Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois 2004; Guha-Sapir, 
Degomme and Phelan 2005; Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2006). 
 
The most visible direct impact of armed civil conflict on household welfare is the destruction 
of human lives. These are often young men in prime working age, though a large number of 
more violent conflicts have been accompanied by violence against civilians, often children, 
women and the elderly (e.g. Dewhirst 1998; Woodward 1995). The death of household 
members in working age means that the household will be left with severely depleted earning 
capacity. This is often enough to push previously vulnerable households into extreme forms 
of poverty (particularly amongst household with widows, orphans and disabled individuals), 
which may well become persistent if the household is unable to replace labour (see Justino 
and Verwimp 2006; Brück and Binzel 2006). Injuries, the spread of infectious disease and 
increases in permanent disabilities caused by violence and conflict may also result in large 
decreases in household welfare. Households may have to draw on existing savings to pay 
 11 
 
for medical bills, which will pose severe financial burden on already vulnerable households. 
Consequences in terms of household labour decisions can also be dramatic and long-lived. 
In many circumstances, the household may choose to replace dead or injured males with 
children. Children are then removed from school, which may in turn deplete the household of 
their stock of human capital for future generations (for evidence see Ghobarah, Huth and 
Russett 2003; Alderman et al. 2004; de Walque 2006). This is made worse when the health 
status of children is badly affected by the conflict. These effects may result in forms of 
poverty trap and contribute towards the reinforcement of structural, persistent forms of 
poverty since negative health and education shocks during childhood have significant 
negative impacts on the long-term performance of individuals (see Miguel and Kremer 2004; 
Bleakley 2007). They can also be aggravated by the severe mental health and the 
psychosocial consequences of disasters and conflicts (amongst adult and children fighters, 
raped women, abused children and old age people), though these have not yet received the 
attention they deserve in the epidemiologic literature or the development economics literature 
on conflict and violence. 
 
1.1.2 Destruction of assets 
During violent conflicts assets get loss or destroyed through heavy fighting and looting. 
These include houses, land, labour, utensils, cattle, livestock and other productive assets. 
The very poor are likely to be the worst affected. For instance, Verpoorten (2003) reports that 
12 per cent of all households lost their house during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, while 
cattle stock on average decreased by 50 per cent. Shemyakina (2006) finds that the homes 
and livelihoods of around seven per cent of households were damaged during the civil war in 
Tajikistan between 1992 and 1998. The Burundi conflict in the 1990s was associated with 
severe asset depletion (Bundervoet and Verwimp 2005). In Latin America, violence has 
significantly affected the efficiency of farm holdings due to the disruption of rural labour 
markets and limits imposed on the operation of larger farms (see Gonzalez and Lopez 2007 
for Colombia and Wood 2005 for El Salvador). The number of deaths and injuries in these 
conflicts were extremely high (see Verwimp 2005; Bundervoet and Verwimp 2005; 
Shemyakina 2006), with unaccountable impacts on individual livelihoods. UNHCR provides 
similar estimates across a variety of recent conflicts.  
 
The destruction of assets by armed conflict, in addition to unstable economic, social and 
political environments, will impact significantly on the ability of affected households to recover 
their economic and social position in post-conflict settings. On the other hand, armed civil 
conflicts take place because there is something worth fighting for, implying that some groups 
and individuals will benefit from violence through looting, redistribution of assets during 
conflict (e.g. Wood 2005 discusses the extent of land redistribution to rebel groups during the 
El Salvador conflict in the early 1990s) and privileged access to market and political 
institutions for those that ‘win’ the conflict or support winning groups during the conflict. 
These effects are as important in understanding processes of armed conflict as the more 
negative effects of fighting as both will have significant bearing on the sustainability of peace 
during the post-conflict period. 
 
1.1.3 Forced displacement  
Armed conflicts are typically accompanied by large population movements. Civilian 
populations are often targets for both armies and rebel groups trying to expand their territorial 
control, weaken population support for opponent groups, increase their own support base 
and/or add to their resources through looting and appropriation of valuable assets and sites 
Kalyvas 2006; Vargas 2007). This leads to population flights from areas of more intense 
fighting or areas where the outbreak of violence is expected. In 2002, almost 34.8 million 
people across the world were forced to seek asylum in another country or within the national 
borders due to violent conflicts (USCR 2004). 25 million people were displaced in 2004 
(UNCHR 2005), many within its own country (IDMC 2006). By cutting off large numbers of 
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people from economic opportunities, internal conflict can lead to a vicious cycle of 
displacement and household poverty from which it is difficult to escape. This is made worse 
by the destruction of social networks and the consequent depleting of important elements of 
the social, economic and political capital of the poor. Refugees from conflict areas and 
displaced populations are found amongst those living under the most difficult forms of socio-
economic exclusion and deprivation (see Chronic Poverty Report 2004–05). The literature 
has distinguished between different types of displacement including forced migration, asylum 
seeking and refugees. Asylum seekers and forced migrants are, to a large extent, young 
economically active household members. These have always been traditionally the most 
likely members in society to migrate. In conflict settings, this effect is compounded by the fact 
they are also the most probable targets for violence and forced recruitment into armies or 
rebel groups (see Czaika and Kis-Katos 2007). Other displaced groups such as the elderly, 
women and children are overrepresented amongst refugees from conflict areas.  
 
Despite these facts, there is little empirical evidence available on the effects of violent conflict 
on the experience of displaced households and individuals, the breakdown of societies and 
the destruction of social networks. Most research so far has focused on collecting event data 
based on counting numbers of refugees (but not necessarily internally displaced 
populations), or numbers of deaths amongst these groups (e.g. USCR 2004). This is 
because most individual- and household-based datasets tend not to follow migrants, and 
even less internally displaced populations. Ibáñez and Moya (2006) and Kondylis (2007) are 
two of the few studies to analyse empirically the cost of displacement at the household level. 
Ibáñez and Moya use household level data for 2,322 Colombian displaced households to 
estimate welfare losses for displaced households to assess how displaced households 
smooth their consumption, and to analyse the strategies they adopt. Their results indicate 
that forced displacement entails significant asset losses, limits the ability of household to 
generate new sources of income, disrupts risk-sharing mechanisms amongst affected 
communities, and forces households to rely on costly strategies in order to smooth 
consumption. Displacement entails in addition significant labour effects, which further limit 
the capacity of households to recover from welfare losses during the conflict. In the context 
of displaced Bosnians during the 1992–95 war, Kondylis (2007) shows that displaced 
populations are less likely to work in the post-conflict period: during that time, displaced men 
and women were less likely to be in work by seven and five percentage points, respectively, 
in relation to the remaining population. 
 
These effects have important long-term impacts. The establishment of sustainable patterns 
of peace and conflict resolution depend largely from the successful integration of displaced 
populations into society (Walter 2004; Sandler and Enders 2004; Steele 2007), as displaced 
populations (as well as demobilised combatants) may provide the basis for opposing political 
factions to continue expanding violence. The demobilisation of troops and returned refugees 
and displaced populations may also create competition for available scarce resources (such 
as jobs, land, assets, available services like health care and so forth), which may, in turn, 
create new forms of exclusion and renewed sources of instability. 
 
Slowly emerging evidence has shown that productivity levels of returnees tend to be lower 
than those that stayed, which may cause difficulties in terms of reintegration of these 
individuals in their original communities (Kondylis 2005), if their original communities exist at 
all after the conflict. In contrast, in the context of young Congolese men in Ugandan refugee 
camps, Clark (2006, 2007) shows that conflict may offer the opportunity of access to new 
forms of household dynamics, social decision-making and livelihood strategies as these 
young people were no longer bound by tradition and ways imposed by older generations. 
There is, however, no study that calculates the impact of these changes on household 
welfare. In a pioneering study using a unique dataset, Deininger, Ibanez and Querubin 
(2004) analyse return patterns of displaced populations during the Colombian conflict. Their 
results show that the desire to return is very much influenced by particular characteristics of 
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the household and the displacement process. In general, agricultural employers, in the origin 
and reception site, families with access to land or households with a dense social network in 
the origin will be more willing to return to their village. On the other hand, vulnerable families, 
such as households with one parent, with female heads or large dependency ratios (often 
found overrepresented amongst the chronically poor), show a strong preference for settling 
in the reception site. Households tend to be less willing to return to their place of origin when 
displacement was caused by distressing events or if security fears are still present. These 
emerging results show a pattern of welfare fragility and high socio-economic vulnerability 
amongst displaced populations including amongst those that decide to return to their site of 
origin. This has enormous implications for post-conflict reconstruction policies suggesting 
that these must not only be concerned with the adequate reintegration of these groups in 
society (either in new relocation regions or in sites of origin), but need also to create forms of 
assistance aimed to help returnee populations access new or renewed markets and 
employment. 
 
1.2 Indirect impact of armed civil conflicts on household welfare: Institutional 
changes 
 
In addition to the direct impacts on household welfare discussed above, armed conflicts have 
substantial effects on the environment and institutions in which households live (see 
mechanisms represented by full lines in Figure 1.1). Changes in social networks, in markets 
and in governmental institutions are in turn likely to affect the welfare and well-being of 
households, as well as determine households’ responses to changes and/or destruction of 
their social, economic and political settings.  
 
1.2.1 Impact of armed conflicts on social networks 
Armed conflicts have profound effects on social relations between family members, 
neighbours and friends, on how communities relate internally and with other communities 
and on the operation of local institutions and their relation with state-level institutions. These 
changes are caused to a large extent by changes in household composition and the 
displacement and migration of households to safer areas as discussed above. They are also 
caused by the dynamics of the conflict itself, such as people telling on each other, different 
groups turning against each other and loss of trust amongst communities. These effects 
result often in changes and/or the breakdown of social relations and social cohesion and the 
loss of risk-sharing arrangements. In other words, the violence generated by armed conflict 
will result in the breakdown of the main components of social capital in any given society 
(Woolcock 1998; Putnam 2000). Social capital is fundamental to the establishment of social 
cohesion and economic stability, as well as creating the conditions for successful and 
sustainable economic growth. One of the most tragic outcomes of armed conflict is the 
breakdown (or the outright destruction) of social capital and the social fabric. The impact of 
this on household welfare can be dramatic as households will no longer be able to rely on 
community relations in times of difficulty, will not be able to access particular employment or 
credit arrangements based on informal ties and may even be excluded from new norms and 
institutional processes. In addition, political forces may strengthen some forms of social 
capital that either feed into conflict itself or constitute the ‘tipping point’ for the outbreak of 
violence. Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) illustrate this clearly in the case of Rwanda, where 
the 1994 genocide was responsible for one of the most distressing collapses of social 
cohesion in modern times. At the same time, the conflict and the genocide were fomented by 
the reinforcement and politicisation of of inter-group cooperation and association. In the 
words of the authors, ‘the genocide was, in a frightening way, an exercise in communal 
cooperation and organization among the participating Hutu. Without the conversion of social 
capital to bond the Hutu together, it is doubtful that the genocide could have been unleashed 
at such a rapid pace with such tragic consequences’ (p. 30). This case study illustrates how 
armed conflict can both lead to and result from the destruction and manipulation of forms of 
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social capital and illustrates clearly what Kalyvas (2007) has designated by the ‘dark side of 
social capital’ (p. 14). Very few research studies, and even less policy documents, reflect on 
the key relevance of these processes in maintaining peace and contributing towards the 
recovery of household welfare in the post-conflict period. 
 
1.2.2 Impact of armed conflict on markets 
We consider two main effects of conflict on existing markets: exchange (the buying and 
selling of commodities) and employment. The impact of exchange and employment factors 
on household welfare in developing countries has traditionally been analysed within the 
framework provided by the household farm model (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986a, 1986b). 
This model allows us to capture behavioural interactions of households for whom agriculture 
constitutes the main source of income. The model combines production, consumption and 
labour supply decisions within the same decision unit in a consistent framework that allows 
for the fact that most households in developing countries produce partly for sale and partly 
for own consumption, at the same time that purchase inputs (e.g. fertilisers and labour) and 
provide inputs (e.g. family labour) from their own resources. According to this framework, 
households make decisions regarding exchange (consume or sell) and labour allocations 
(farm and non-farm) depend on the income profit derived from household’s production. This 
depends in turn on four key factors: the market price of goods sold and purchased by the 
household, the price of a staple good produced (and possibly sold) by the household, the 
market price of labour (wage) and profit obtained from their market activities. Changes in the 
price of staple goods are of key importance for household decisions. When the price of 
agricultural staple increases, we would expect the household to decrease its consumption of 
that good. But if the household is a consumer as well as a producer of that good (which is the 
case modelled in Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986a), we must take into consideration the 
positive profit effect of the price change, which may well outweigh the negative effect on 
price increases on consumption. This positive profit effect may, in turn, release household 
labour to off-farm employment. Any economic and political shock will impact on these 
mechanisms. Empirical evidence on price effects of armed conflict is scarce though some 
sparse evidence has reported an increase in prices of staple food (see Verpoorten 2005; 
Bundervoet 2006). This increase has however been more than offset by reported dramatic 
decreases in prices of commodities produced and assets held by the household (particularly 
cattle and other livestock), as well as the decrease in access to exchange markets. In 
particular, the destruction of roads, train lines and other infrastructure will increase 
transaction costs for households involved in market exchanges and, in extreme cases, will 
result in return to subsistence activities. This is particularly true when markets are 
themselves destroyed by fighting. The ability of a household to respond to price shocks 
depends on the sign of the shock, which, in turn, is related to different household types. A 
negative shock will result in losses in household utility and welfare if the household is not 
able to switch activities or no alternative activities exist. If the household is able to switch 
activities in order to take advantage of them (for instance, looting but also possibility of 
access to new markets, including informal or illegal markets through alliances of support of 
different fighting factions) then losses may be small or the effect may even be positive. We 
cannot truly understand micro processes of violence during armed conflict without 
understanding further the role of exchange markets both as an opportunity for predatory 
behaviour and a source of livelihood for those involved in armed conflict. In addition, 
accommodating for the impact of armed violence will transmit the shock to other markets and 
therefore may set off a series of second-round effects which also need to be considered. 
 
Also very few studies have analysed the impact of armed conflict on employment markets, 
whether it be the supply of labour by the household or the demand for household labour from 
off-farm sources. Analyses of processes leading to the onset of armed conflict often mention 
the presence of a large group of unemployed youth as a pre-condition for the effective 
recruitment of fighters and, therefore, for the rise of armed rebel groups. The impact of 
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armed conflict on labour markets remains largely unknown, with the exception of studies that 
analyse the labour market impact of demobilisation and reintegration of ex-fighters and 
displaced populations in post-conflict settings. It seems evident that households affected by 
death, illness or recruitment of their members will be unable to undertake off-farm work as 
their subsistence labour needs will take priority. It is unclear how these effects will reflect in 
existing labour markets, how labour market characteristics (e.g. unemployment, 
discrimination, exclusion, and so forth) will impact on the process of generation of violence 
during armed conflict (to control populations, resources and territories) and how labour 
markets are shaped by armed conflict.  
 
1.2.3 Impact of armed conflict on political institutions 
Armed civil conflict changes the structure of political institutions, both local and national, as 
well as their ability to provide public goods and guarantee the establishment of property 
rights, the rule of law and security. Violent conflicts frequently result from and/or lead to 
forms of state and governance failure (e.g. Zartman 1995; King and Zheng 2001). The war 
effort affects negatively social spending as well as the institutional ability to run the economy, 
provide even basic social services (such as health care, education, sanitation, etc) and 
maintain socio-economic stability. But they also offer important opportunities for new classes 
of local and regional leaders to challenge political powers (e.g. Reno 2002). In most conflicts, 
a number of actors (militia-leaders and members, political elites, businessmen, petty traders, 
but also households and groups) have tried to improve their position and to exploit the 
opportunities offered by a context of internal conflict. The result is a profound reshaping of 
relations between populations, the politico-military or economic elites and legal and judiciary 
structures. Political relations are shaped and reshaped during times of conflict thereby 
inducing processes of social and political transformation (see Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2004). One way in which those processes occur is through the emergence of local 
‘governance’ structures in places where ‘government’ is absent. In the available literature, 
such circumstances are usually referred to as state ‘collapse’ (Zartman 1995). However, the 
collapse of ‘government’ does not necessarily have to be accompanied by the collapse of 
‘governance’, rather it is accompanied by institutional changes as different actors replace 
weak or inexistent institutions in the provision of local public goods, the enforcement of 
property rights and social norms and the provision of security. While the development and 
political science literatures provide substantiated accounts of such institutional changes at 
the national level, we have only limited evidence on changes of power relations at a 
grassroots level and their impact on local institutional processes and structures. The 
important issue in understanding the relationship between the onset and duration of armed 
conflict is not to equate the rise of conflict with fragile or weak states, but to understand how 
state and non-state actors interact throughout the conflict, how their different (or similar) 
strategies of violence determine population support and territorial control and how different 
state and non-state actors’ activities are embedded in different areas and communities. 
 
1.3 Indirect impact of armed civil conflict on household welfare: economic 
growth effects 
 
Armed conflict has a very significant impact on economic growth. Knight, Loayza and 
Villanueva (1996) have estimated that civil wars lead, on average, to a permanent income 
loss around two percent of GDP. In addition, Collier (1999) has calculated, using cross-
sectional evidence for 92 countries between 1960 and 1989, that national incomes, following 
a seven-year civil war, will be roughly 15 per cent lower than had the war not happened (see 
also Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003). Armed conflict is responsible for the destruction of 
infrastructure, markets and social cohesion. It is also associated with the redirection of 
significant resources from productive activities into military action. Periods of political 
instability and possible increased in violence will hamper both public and private investments. 
Migration and displacement of people result in the removal from the country of potentially 
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important private funds that could be used for investment, as well as valuable human capital. 
Armed conflict also affects the capacity of economies responding to other shocks. Research 
has found that external shocks could lead to an immediate and substantial deceleration in 
growth in societies characterized by the presence of ‘latent’ social conflicts (e.g. high ethnic 
diversity), and low institutional or social capacity for resolving conflicts (e.g. those 
characterised by low political and individual rights) (Rodrik 1998).  
 
Economic growth has been shown to affect the likelihood of armed conflict. Macroeconomic 
analyses of civil war point to low-per capita income as a very robust explanatory factor in 
determining the risk of violent internal conflict breaking out (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon 
and Laitin 2003). Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2003) find that economic growth is 
strongly negatively related to the incidence of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa: a negative 
growth shock of five percentage points increases the likelihood of conflict by one-half in the 
following year.  
 
The destruction of physical, human, social and political capital of the country impacts 
severely on post-war recovery, and may even influence the probability of conflict re-igniting 
(Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2003). They predict that a country that has experience a civil 
war is much more likely to experience another conflict in the future. The disruption and 
destruction of infrastructure caused by violence often results in severe cutbacks in state’s 
capacity to provide services such as education and health care (Stewart et al. 2001a, 
2001b). Significant reductions in social services reinforce further the inability of households 
to fall back on state support in times of crises (e.g. safety-nets). Reductions in social services 
may result from diminished state financial capacity but also from specific political agendas 
pursued by governments. In many contexts, winners in conflicts have been known to restrict 
access to education for the losers by limiting enrolments in some levels of education and/or 
by segregating schools along racial (South Africa), ethnic (pre-1994 Rwanda) and religious 
lines (Northern Ireland) (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Shemyakina 2006). Low levels of 
economic growth combined with weak socio-political institutions and specific political 
agendas may therefore highlight existing inequalities or produce new forms of inequality. 
This may in turn fuel further resentment and generate tensions across population groups, 
creating a cycle of impoverishment, violence and instability from which many countries 
cannot recover fully.  
 
1.4 Indirect impact of armed civil conflict on household welfare: Distributional 
channels 
 
Recent development economics literature has show that changes in household welfare are 
determined by changes in economic growth and changes in the distribution of incomes (e.g. 
Ravallion 1999). Large shocks have been shown to produce profound restructuring of 
existing social norms and distributional arrangements (see Dercon 2004 for the case of the 
AIDS epidemic in Africa). Armed conflict, in particular, and its aftermath may well result in the 
exclusion of certain groups and the undermining of social cohesion. A large literature has 
examined the impact of inequalities on the onset of civil conflict. Much less exists on the 
impact of conflict on distributional arrangements in societies affected by violence though it is 
well-accepted that conflicts will result in new forms of social arrangements and political 
structures that are bound to benefit some groups in detriment of others. These changes in 
distribution, and potential association with new forms of social injustices in post-conflict 
periods, may lead to further outbreaks of violence. 
 
The relationship between forms of income inequality and the onset of violent mass conflicts 
has been tested with mixed results (see Cramer 2002 for a discussion). Analyses of 
between-group, rather than within-group, inequalities have been more successful. This body 
of research has emphasized the importance of horizontal inequalities between groups, 
classified by ethnicity, religion and other cultural characteristics, as sources of conflict (e.g. 
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Stewart 2002; Langer 2004; Stewart, Brown and Mancini 2005; Mancini 2005; Østby 2006), 
as well as of societal levels of polarization (e.g. Esteban and Ray 1991, 1994; Foster and 
Wolfson 1992; Wolfson 1994; Reynal-Querol 2001; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2003; 
Caselli and Coleman 2006), categorical inequalities (Tilly 1998) and ethnic fragmentation 
(e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; Elbadawi 1992). Rises in economic and social disparities 
between different population groups, systematic social exclusion and other forms of 
perceived unfairness in social relations often result in the accumulation of discontent to a 
sufficiently high level to break social cohesion (Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Bates 1983; 
Horowitz 1985; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Midlarsky 1988; Schock 1996), and 
increase the probability of some population groups engaging in rent-seeking or predatory 
activities (Benhabib and Rustichini 1991; Fay 1993; Sala-i-Martin 1996; Fajnzylber, 
Lederman and Loayza 1998; Grossman 1991, 1999). Social discontent and frustration with 
living conditions can act as strong motivators for conflict and for the participation of 
individuals into organised forms of violent conflict. In Ted Gurr’s words: the ‘primary causal 
sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization 
of the discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and 
actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating 
condition for participants in collective violence’ (Gurr 1970, p. 13). This can be a powerful 
mechanism when forms of discontent coincide with ethnic, religious or regional divides. 
 
1.5 Long-term effects of armed conflicts and poverty traps 
 
The short- and long-term depletion of household physical and human capital is bound to 
create forms of destitution from which households will find impossible to recover from. There 
is a large literature on poverty traps (see Ravallion 1998). Dasgupta and Ray (1986) describe 
how below some critical nutritional level, no productive activity can be exercised. If during an 
economic crisis all assets get destroyed (except labour) at the same time that individual 
nutritional status (presumably of household workers) goes below a certain threshold, then the 
household stands little chance of recovering their economic status by resorting to productive 
means. Only a serious windfall (e.g. aid) can push this household back into recovery path. 
 
Recent empirical literature has dedicated considerable efforts to determining the long-term 
effects of civil conflicts (see Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2003). In many circumstances, 
these effects can result in the reinforcement of structural forms of poverty or the emergence 
of new pockets of poverty resulting in poverty traps. Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003) 
estimate that adult and infant mortality increases by 13 per cent during conflict and remains 
11 per cent higher for at least five years. De Walque (2006) shows how the severe impact of 
mortality during the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia in 1975–78 can be observed almost 
30 years later. Bundervoet and Verwimp (2005) show that the Burundi civil war in 1993, and 
subsequent embargo, has had significant negative impacts on the nutritional status of rural 
populations due to direct destruction caused by the conflict, as well as increases in food 
prices. If nutrition gets affected, particular that of children, future household welfare will get 
badly affected. Children affected by both shocks in Burundi had a height-for-age of one-
standard deviation lower than children not affected by the shocks. Children from households 
unable to smooth consumption may face health deterioration (Behrman 1988) and lesser 
body size (Foster 1995). Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2004) use panel household 
survey data collected in 1983–84, 1987 and yearly from 1992 to 2001 to show the impact of 
the Zimbabwe civil war in the 1970s, which was followed by severe droughts in 1982–83 and 
1983–84. The authors find that in 2001, on average, children in the sample affected by the 
shocks would have been 3.4 cm taller, had completed an additional 0.85 grades of schooling 
and would have started school six months earlier had she not been affected by the shocks. 
Similar evidence is found by Akresh and Verwimp (2006) for Rwanda.  
 
Poverty traps can also result from labour market outcomes. On the one hand, return to 
subsistence agriculture hinders the capacity of households to accumulate profits and 
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therefore limits the release of household labour to off-farm employment. In addition, the 
possession of risky assets in times of violence leads to the depletion of household’s savings. 
This may in turn impact on household’s activity choices and increased preference for low risk 
low return activities. Such choices will hinder the household’s capacity to accumulate assets 
and use them in times of crisis, a compound effect resulting from the simultaneous 
occurrence of conflict and economic (related) shocks. These effects may be further amplified 
by the displacement of households and the death and injury of household members, which 
will limit the labour market participation of vulnerable households. Ibanez and Moya (2006) 
report that in the case of conflict it is not necessarily low skill levels that limit labour market 
participation, but rather the impossibility in using skills due to the destruction of networks and 
the difficulty of integrating into new environments. Although some of these households could 
in principle be able to accumulate assets and avoid poverty, they become trapped below a 
minimum asset threshold needed to achieve a viable accumulation strategy (see Barrett and 
Carter 2006; Jalan and Ravallion 2004; Loshin and Ravallion 2004 for further examples). 
Although a lot of work still remains to be done, these first studies suggest that the impact of 
armed civil conflicts on household physical, human and social capital may be a powerful 
mechanism whereby violence in armed conflict may force individuals and households into 
long-lasting poverty, adding to increased household vulnerability to other shocks and 
intensifying the number of chronically poor households. The magnitude of these effects is 
determined to a large extent by the way in which different households respond to conflict-
induced shocks. 
 
2  Household responses to armed conflict 
 
The very visible impacts of armed conflicts discussed in the previous section are bound to 
change the economic and social behaviour of households directly or indirectly affected 
violence. This section analyses the strategies adopted by households in conflict settings to 
protect their welfare, as a response to the effects analysed above. These responses may in 
turn impact on the evolution of conflict, whether and how it escalates, and whether and how it 
may reignite in the future. The first order direct and indirect impact of armed civil conflict on 
household welfare is represented in Figure 1.1 by the straight lines, whereas the second-
order effects of responses to conflict itself are represented by the dashed lines. 
 
There is a large development economics literature on coping strategies adopted by 
households in times of crises. The literature has shown abundant evidence that households 
living in risky environments generally develop a complexity of (ex ante) risk-management and 
(ex post) risk-coping strategies. Townsend (1994) outlines five common strategies followed 
by households in developing countries: the diversification of land holdings into several 
spatially separated plots and into various crops (see also Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; 
Haggblade, Hazell and Brown 1989; Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001), the storage of grain 
from one year to the next, resorting to purchases and sales of assets such as bullocks and 
land that could have been accumulated as a precaution against the occurrence of a shock, 
borrowing from village lenders or other moneylenders (see also Eswaran and Kotwal 1989; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Udry 1994; Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998) and the use 
of gifts and transfers from informal mutual support networks (e.g. family, friends, neighbours, 
funeral societies, etc) (see Rosenzweig and Stark 1986; Platteau 1991; Townsend 1993; 
Grimard 1997; Cox and Jimenez 1998).  
 
Dasgupta (1993) reports increases in fertility amongst households living in uncertain 
environments. The increase in fertility rates is thought to compensate for the loss children in 
the early years, as well as increasing household labour and creating an insurance 
mechanism for old age security. Morduch (1990, 1995) and Dercon (1996) describe how 
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households in risky environments choose to undertake economic activities with lower return 
but likely to have lower economic risk and be more certain of successful outcome, such as 
subsistence agriculture or cultivation of safer traditional crop varieties rather than riskier but 
higher-return varieties. This strategy is also popular amongst households with little assets 
that could serve as collateral for credit access (see Dercon 2000). Dercon (2005) identifies 
the following coping strategies during the 1984–85 Ethiopian famine: cutting meals and 
portions, selling valuables, relying on wild foods and moving to feeding camps. Lokshin and 
Yemtsov (2004) show that in times of crisis (the article examines household coping 
strategies during the recent Russian financial crisis) the choices of survival strategies are 
determined by the level of human capital in the household. The higher the household human 
capital, the more likely is the household to choose active strategies. Households with low 
human capital, households headed by pensioners, and low-educated households will face 
greater difficulties in responding to shocks implying that poverty is likely to be entrenched 
amongst these groups. Kazianga and Udry (2004) analyse strategies followed by households 
to smooth consumption during a period of severe drought between 1981 and 1985 in rural 
Burkina Faso. These include livestock, grain storage and inter-household transfers. They find 
that households rely almost exclusively on self-insurance in the form of adjustments to grain 
stocks to smooth out consumption, with little reliance on risk sharing or the use of buffer 
stocks such as livestock. Rosenzweig (1988, 1996) examines changes in location of 
residence of some or all household members. 
 
Strategies adopted by households in response to economic risks and shocks in peaceful 
regions may differ from those use in conflict settings. They may also differ amongst rural and 
urban households as urban households will have less access to land and less mobility (once 
fighting reaches urban areas) than rural households. There is currently little understanding of 
differences between war-time and post-war coping strategies of households, or between 
those of rural and urban households, though evidence is slowly accumulating. Violence 
during armed conflict typically results in the destruction of essential infrastructure and social 
services, the breakdown of the rule of law, as well as with significant reductions in private 
and public investment.  
 
Armed conflicts are distinguished from other shocks by their deliberately destructive nature, 
including the intentional destruction of common coping strategies adopted by households in 
economically insecure environments, such as social networks and family ties, accumulation 
of agricultural assets and land and so forth (see de Waal 1997). Political shocks such as civil 
war have a covariate character, but households with characteristics that are salient to the 
conflict may be particularly badly hit by the initial shock. For instance, while a high level of 
education may be a secure source of income in times of peace, it can become a liability in 
times of violence as it was the case during the Cultural Revolution in China or the Khmer 
Rouge regime in Cambodia (e.g. de Walque 2006), in which educated population groups 
were specifically targeted by the conflict. As a result, males of school age during the period 
have lower educational level than previous or subsequent cohorts. Other known household 
insurance mechanisms and consumption smoothing strategies may fail in a situation of 
conflict (see below). These perverse effects of conflicts are likely to have severe negative 
long-term impacts on the accumulation of human capital and assets in households and 
communities affected by violence. These mechanisms and processes are still ill-understood 
in the development literature, where little attention has been paid to the analysis of 
differences in coping strategies adopted by households in peaceful versus conflict settings. 
This section analyses some of the slowly accumulating evidence on coping strategies 
adopted by households in conflict settings. 
 
2.1 Savings and buffer stock in conflict settings 
 
The ability of households to adapt their welfare status to shocks typically depends on the 
level of savings of the household and the efficacy of local insurance and credit markets. If the 
 20 
 
household is not able to insure its income against shocks or is not able to borrow when a 
shock takes place, it must resort to savings. Households may fall into poverty or become 
severely destitute when accumulated savings are not sufficient to cover the shortfall in 
income. Livestock is one common form of savings accumulation amongst rural households in 
developing countries (e.g. Binswanger and McIntire 1987). During armed conflicts, livestock 
can however become a very risky form of savings since it can be easily stolen or killed. 
Bundervoet reports that during the Burundi conflict in the early 1990s the total number of 
livestock was reduced by 30 per cent, while almost 20 per cent of households in conflict 
areas reported to have lost livestock due to theft and pillaging. As a result, households in 
conflict areas do not resort to the accumulation and sales of livestock to protect their welfare 
levels in times of difficulty. They are rather more likely to adopt to the cultivation of low return 
(and also low risk) crops that can feed their families. Verpoorten (2005) reports that, in 
Rwanda, households did not in general sold cattle in response to conflict as they would do as 
a response to other shocks (see Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998). This is because road 
unsafety prevented households most targeted by violence from accessing markets where 
cattle could be sold, at the same time that cattle was seen as an insecure asset, likely to be 
targeted by violence. Households less affected by violence sold their cattle but suffered from 
overall lower prices (Verpoorten 2005). This will in turn affect the ability of households to 
accumulate sufficient assets to escape poverty and reduce their vulnerability of poverty. 
 
2.2 Return to subsistence agriculture and other low-risk activities 
 
Minimising risky activities is probably the most widely observed effect in times of conflict, in 
the run-up to a war as well as in the post-war period (see Brück 2004). Ex-ante, households 
that predicted occurrence of political violence will tend to hold a lower risk/lower return 
portfolio of activities in order to minimise their risk of serious income shortfall, even at the 
price of a lower average return. Similarly to the mechanisms outlined in Morduch (1995) and 
Dercon (2002), in times of violence, rural households tend to return to subsistence farming 
(see Brück 2004a; Deininger 2003; McKay and Loveridge 2005). This is true for both 
households that typically hold little or no liquid assets such as livestock and for those that are 
specifically targeted by the conflict. Increased levels of socio-economic instability and loss of 
trust between different individuals and groups accentuate these mechanisms. Deininger 
(2003) shows that civil strife in Uganda during the 1990s reduced the propensity of 
individuals to start up new enterprises and made it more likely that those which had already 
been established had gone out of business, possibly back into subsistence forms of 
agriculture.  
 
Brück (2004a, 2004b) discusses how war-time activity choices during the Mozambican civil 
war (such as subsistence farming) may improve the welfare status of vulnerable households 
living in extreme poverty when market and social exchange limit any welfare gains. McKay 
and Loveridge (2005) report that, in Rwanda, during the genocide in 1994 and subsequent 
insecure years, the retreat to more autarkic modes of production and the focus on 
subsistence crops was associated with the improved nutritional status of children in the post-
conflict period. Reductions in income do not necessarily imply a worsening of the nutritional 
standard when the farm household substituted food crops for cash crops (McKay and 
Loveridge 2005). Evidence on the potentially positive effects of autarkic modes of production 
in conflict and post-conflict situations must of course be balanced against the extent of 
income/asset loss due to the destruction of markets and market access. This area of 
research is still in its infancy. 
 
2.3 Intra-household reallocation of labour 
 
The direct impact of conflict on the composition and cohesion of households can lead to 
severe human capital depletion resulting in significant changes to labour allocations within 
the household. Deaths and injuries are some of the most visible effects of violent conflicts, 
 21 
 
requiring significant adaptation within the household. Donovan et al. (2003) analyse the 
effect of adult death on Rwandan households using self-reported coping strategies collected 
in interviews with 1,500 rural households. They found that some households sell assets, 
adjust their crop mix, adjust area planted or/and hire in more labour. The effect on farm 
labour supply was dominant: 6 out of 10 households reported a reduction in farm labour due 
to a male adult death and 5 out of 10 for a female adult death. Half of the households 
reported no effect on other income generating activities for a male death and 80 per cent did 
so in case of a female adult death. In the case of Tanzania, Beegle (2005) did not find any 
increase in hours farmed by surviving household members after an adult death, but found 
decreased activity in the farming of maize, cassava and beans. She draws attention to the 
fact that households experiencing decreased income or farm output after an adult death do 
not necessarily experience a reduction of income, production or consumption per capita, as 
other household members may replace lost labour. These household members are typically 
women (widows) and children. 
 
In times of stress, children are often needed for other activities (e.g. Jacoby and Skoufias 
1992; Baez and Santos 2006). In particular, older children may be required to replace adult 
males that have become fighters, died or have been injured. Or they may be required to 
become fighters themselves. Deininger (2003) calculates that an increase of 10 per cent in 
the proportion of households affected by civil strife in a given community in Uganda 
decreased investment in schooling by about one year of schooling. This effect is due to a 
complexity of reasons, amongst which are labour substitution effects, feelings of fear and 
insecurity and changes in household social preferences. Shemyakina (2006) reports a drop 
in female enrolment rates following the onset of the 1992–1998 civil war in Tajikistan, and 
throughout the conflict. At the end of the war, in 1999, school enrolments were lower for girls 
aged 12–16 living in high conflict intensity areas. The main reason was a decrease in returns 
to education of girls (but not boys) in high conflict zones, leading to an increased preference 
for educating boys rather than girls. Interestingly, school enrolments of girls were higher in 
rural areas where access to subsistence agriculture implied less reliance on outside income.  
 
2.4 Self-recruitment into armed groups  
  
Armed conflicts may forge new opportunities for many and a number of actors have used 
conflict and violence as a means to try to improve their position and to take advantage of 
potential opportunities offered by conflict. Despite the potentially high individual costs, many 
choose to participate in fighting due to the presence of significant selective incentives (Olson 
1965).8 In several instances, becoming a fighter may be seen as a means to try to improve 
low welfares and as a rural livelihood coping strategy. Individuals may be attracted to militias 
and armies by the possibility of looting and other material gains. Recruitment may also be 
viewed as a viable alternative to unemployment by many. When joining militias or military 
groups, young men may get access to food and clothing as well as recognition and sense of 
becoming valuable which may not be available otherwise. Low returns to agriculture and high 
rates of unemployment may push young men into militias but may also be used as a strategy 
for risk diversification for households that anticipate being affected by armed violence. They 
secure themselves by supporting the militias and benefit from possible economic benefits 
offered by the militias.  
 
Some studies have shown that socio-emotional motivations (e.g. doing the right thing, 
following community social norms, sense of justice) may matter as much or more than 
selective incentives in explaining individual participation in collective acts of violence (see 
Petersen 2001; Wood 2003). This has not ruled out strong evidence for individual response 
                                                 
8  Mancur Olson (1965) lists the main selective incentives for participation in forms of collective action such as armed 
conflict as: coercion, monetary incentives, insurance, price discounts, erotic incentives, psychological incentives and 
moral incentives. 
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to selective incentives in armed conflict, particularly when selective incentives act as a form 
of coping with economic, social and political insecurity, and of protecting those that join acts 
of violence and their families (Kalyvas and Kocher 2006). Collier and Hoeffler (1998) stress 
the gap between the returns from taking up arms relative to those from conventional 
economic activities, such as farming, as the causal mechanism linking low income to the 
incidence of civil war. Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) report how RUF fighters during the 
recent Sierra Leone conflict were promised jobs and money as a form of alluring candidates. 
Another militia group, the CDF, helped to meet the basic needs of their members and 
provided increased security for their families. Material benefits were generally sufficient to 
satisfy basic needs but not much else, which may have attracted those individuals with little 
other livelihood options. Humphreys and Weinstein’s analysis of fighters’ profiles shows that 
more than 60 per cent of fighters belonging to both CDF and RUF reported ‘improve the 
situation in Sierra Leone’ as their main motivation to join the militias, following by improved 
prospects of getting a job, more money and food in the case of RUF and protecting their 
families, jobs and money in the case of CDF.  
 
In one of the only existing empirical analysis of profiles of conflict perpetrators, Verwimp 
(2005) shows that perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide are over-represented 
amongst the educated population of Rwanda, amongst those with a part-time or full-time off-
farm activity and amongst those households with higher incomes and that eat more meat, 
milk and eggs. But they are also over-represented amongst the unemployed and quasi-
landless households. In the words of the author (p.29):  
 
the interests for members of both these groups to participate in the genocide is to be 
found in their respective relation to the land and labour markets. The landlords or 
employers had ‘something to defend’, meaning their job, their land, their farm or farm 
output and their overall privileged position in Rwandan society. The poor, landless 
group on the other hand, whose livelihood crucially depends on the availability of off-
farm low skilled jobs (mostly working on someone else’s farm) and/or the chance to 
land rent from a landlord, were in a very vulnerable position. They could expect to gain 
from participation [author’s italics]: it has been widely documented that a large number 
of participants, mainly the rank and file among the perpetrators were very interested in 
the property of the murdered Tutsi. Among the property, land was a much desired 
asset.  
 
2.5 Non-forced migration 
 
Collier (2000) suggests that diasporas in OECD countries increase the risk of a post-conflict 
country falling back into conflict largely due to some Diaspora funds funding armed factions. 
This and similar evidence has resulted in large efforts being put into monitoring and limiting 
the international transfer of funds to conflict regions. But at the micro-level remittances can 
play a key role in mitigating some of the negative effects of armed conflict on livelihoods and 
household welfare. Migration has been arguably the most common form of household coping 
strategy in times of distress. The development literature has long recognised the importance 
of migration (and resulting remittances) as a mechanism used by households in non-conflict 
settings to secure their incomes and improve their welfare (e.g. Taylor 1999; House of 
Commons 2004; OECD 2005). Evidence on the importance of migration in contexts of armed 
civil conflict is scarce. Violence is a significant motivation for migration, specially forced 
migration (Moore and Shellman 2004). But even in conflict areas economic incentives may 
lead households to migrate (see Engel and Ibanez 2007), either as an ex-ante reaction to the 
threat of conflict, or an ex-post response to unstable economic and political conditions. 
Households with less outside options or households that value less the welfare benefits of 
potential reception sites are less likely to migrate (see Czaika and Kis-Katos 2007).  
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In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in remittances originated from economic 
and political crises in migrant- and refugee-exporting countries (Goldring 2002). Yet little is 
known on the impact of these on recipient households that return or are left behind in those 
countries. One reason is the difficulty in determined how migration and remittances are used 
as deliberate economic strategies on the part of households facing the situation of armed 
conflict (Lindley 2007), either as an ex-ante security management mechanism or an ex-post 
reaction to violence. Other reasons are related to usual difficulties of doing research in 
conflict contexts: lack of data, insufficient official information on the flow of payments and 
transfers and difficulty of tracking remittances that are made through informal channels, such 
as hawala networks, or sending money through friends and relatives (Lindley 2007). 
Remittances have, however, the potential to be important mechanisms of household security 
both during and after conflict. Justino and Shemyakina (2007) show that following the 
Tajikistan civil war in the 1990s, households in the conflict affected areas are more likely to 
receive remittances as compared to the households in the lesser affected areas (40 versus 
36 per cent), while the mean value of annual remittances is 12 per cent higher regions in 
Tajikistan most affected by the civil war. Lindley (2007) examines the case of Hargeisa, 
Somalia. Though Diaspora donations and remittances have a significant role in shaping the 
political and economic development of Hargeisa, her study reveals that large-scale migration 
in the region, trigerred by armed conflict, resulted in a valuable source of income for those 
left behind. Remittances are used for general living expenses and human capital investments 
and less so for business and property. They have helped slowly to mitigate some of the 
economic and social effects of the conflict such as lack of assets to markets, loss of 
livelihoods, removal of children from school. They play a key role in women-led households 
where the breadwinner was lost to conflict (or migrated himself). Remittances can greatly 
affect labour force participation decisions of household members, in particular the decision to 
retain or enrol children in school, and consumption smoothing strategies. In many 
circumstances, remittances can act as the channel through which otherwise vulnerable 
households may avoid the traps of poverty and destitution following the direct and indirect 
impacts of armed civil conflict on their welfare. 
 
3  Policy interventions at household level in 
conflict settings 
 
The micro level processes of the type described in the previous sections are generally 
absent from most policy programmes aimed at preventing, managing, transforming and 
resolving violent conflicts. The difficulties associated with micro-level research processes of 
armed conflict and the resulting scarcity in empirical analyses means that such policies are 
being designed on the basis of very little hard evidence. There have been a few efforts to 
fulfil this gap but with little political impact thus far (see World Bank 2005). The international 
development community has largely focussed its attention on reactive, damage-limiting 
policy frameworks to reduce insecurity, bring violent conflicts under control, and minimise 
their negative impacts on development (see Addison and Murshed 2002; DFID 2005). It has 
been less good at thinking strategically about how to cut through and reverse vicious cycles 
of armed conflict, how to build pragmatic and durable systems of local development and 
global peace that incorporate real assessments of individual and group behaviour and how to 
assemble synergies between local, national and international coalitions to support real 
change (see OECD 2005). The ability to clearly identify how individuals and households 
behave, react and relate to other households and communities in armed conflict settings and 
a sound understanding of the consequences of resulting violence on their welfare and 
adjustment behaviour are critical to the design of effective post-conflict recovery policies, and 
essential to promote more proactive strategies amongst the development community in 
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formulating adequate strategies to end armed conflicts, as well as prevent the eruption of 
new cycles of violence. 
 
Emerging literature has increasingly argued for the need to combine traditional post-conflict 
policies, mostly concerned with state security, with structural development programmes that 
address important issues of human and economic security of individuals and groups (see 
discussion in Picciotto 2004), such as those examined in the sections above. These 
measures are particularly important to reduce the risk of renewed conflict (Collier 2000), as 
they can be designed to address social, economic and political risk factors – such as 
reduction in household welfare, changes in household behaviour, changes in social norms 
and local political alliances – that resulted in the outbreak of conflict in the first place and do 
not necessarily disappear after the conflict. At the same time, successful poverty reduction 
policies, including PRSPS, need to be conflict-sensitive by recognising the specific conflict 
factors present in each country and attempting to redress these factors (see World Bank 
2005).  
 
This section aims to provide a starting point for further discussions on post-conflict policies 
that may potentially have important effects on the welfare of households affected by violence. 
A large literature already exists that discusses reconstruction policies from a macro-level 
perspective. This section focuses on particular policies targeted at households, and intends 
to complement that literature. We discuss two types of policies, which we have designated by 
reconstruction policies and assistance policies.  
 
3.1 Household-level reconstruction policies 
 
Despite the various strategies adopted by households living in areas directly and indirectly 
affected by armed conflict, vulnerability, poverty and deprivation remains high amongst large 
numbers of households. This is to a large extent caused by severe market imperfections, 
such as limited opportunities to use assets as insurance due to violence, as well as 
constraints in credit and insurance markets. It is also caused by constraints to adopting 
effective forms of income diversification due to poor property rights, limited or no access to 
existing and new market opportunities, the breakdown of the rule of law and increases in 
physical security. In the post-conflict period, the challenges of reintegrating ex-fighters and 
displaced populations, and of rebuilding institutions, infrastructure and communities torn by 
violence hinder further the process of reconstructing household welfare. We examine two 
types of household-level reconstruction policies: restoration of community relations and 
market recovery programmes.  
 
3.1.1 Restoring community relations 
Policies aimed at promoting sustainable peace structures must address seriously the 
breakdown of households and communities caused by armed conflicts. In particular, 
displaced populations and demobilised soldiers left without outside social and economic 
options are likely to create a group of people who may have little to gain from a return to 
peace. Unless their conditions are improved noticeably, this can well undermine attempts for 
sustainable conflict resolution. Successful integration of displaced populations into society is 
a key precondition to avoid the economic decline that makes it more difficult to bring civil 
unrest to an end (Walter 2004) and that may provide the basis for rebels to recruit fighters to 
expand violence elsewhere (Sandler and Enders 2004). Attempts to end internal conflicts 
and eradicate the sources that originate them will have to be built upon a better 
comprehension of the dynamics of displacement (Castles and van Hear 2005), as well 
patterns of resettlement during and after conflicts. For instance, the increase in asylum 
applications and refugee populations from conflict zones since the late 1980s has led to 
considerable public concern within the European Union. Their influence can be positive, 
through providing capital, skills and leadership for peace-building. But diasporas can also 
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support the continuation of conflicts, and engage in illegal cross-border activities (van Hear 
1998, 2003). Many refugees and migrants from conflict zones suffer social exclusion in their 
resettlement regions, which can lead to radicalisation and criminalisation. This has been 
observed both in receptor countries in Europe (van Hear 2003), but also in areas within the 
country where refugee and displaced population moved into new communities (see Steele 
2007 for Colombia). On the other hand, the demobilisation of troops and returned refugees 
and displaced populations to sites of origin (or their resettlement in new sites) may create 
competition for available scarce resources (such as jobs, land, assets, available services like 
health care and so forth). This may also create new forms of exclusion and sources of further 
instability.  
 
Not everyone is willing to return to their regions of origin, either because they have lost all 
links to their former relations or because they still fear violence and criminality in the 
immediate post-conflict period. Deininger et al. (2003: 26) in a pioneer study of displaced 
populations note that  
 
return programs should be particularly targeted to households with access to land, 
agricultural employers or families with strong links to collective actions organizations. 
Such households are less equipped to face the conditions of urban areas. Return 
programs should also focus on recently displaced households. As the displacement 
period increase, households adapt to the reception site and, therefore, may rather 
settle in the new place of residence than face and uncertain situation in their villages of 
origin. On the other hand, vulnerable households or families that flee after being the 
victim of a violent event reveal a lower disposition to return. Policies for this group of 
the displaced population should concentrate on supporting the settlement process in 
the reception place. 
 
Similar empirical evidence in other conflict contexts would be invaluable for the success of 
post-conflict policies of reintegration, the re-building of destroyed societies and networks and 
the prevention of new conflicts. 
 
It is a well-known fact in the anthropological literature that armed conflicts lead to changes 
and reconstruction of identities before, during and after the conflict and the emergence of 
new norms and forms of organisation and cooperation amongst communities. These 
changes often facilitate violence and create ways in which they can be manipulated before 
and during armed conflict to support the overall aims of leaders. Understanding these issues 
and bringing them into political and legal processes of conflict mediation and resolution can 
facilitate work with communities to resist involvement in violence, though this area of 
research is still in its infancy. One issue of particular importance is that of considering young 
people (which before the conflict provided key conditions for the formation of fighting units) 
as key actors both in peace and war times, and the need to channel their energy into 
productive activities. Young people constitute one important target group for post-conflict 
reconstruction policies. Although large attention has been given to the thorny issue of child 
soldiers, less attention has been paid to the potential impact of young people’s political views 
and activities, and the role of young people as political actors in the post-conflict period, with 
highly developed political views and experiences of politics (Clark 2007). Another group of 
interest is that of refugees that remain in their new locations or return to their former 
communities. Their status often brings about tensions with those who stayed behind. At the 
same time, different experiences by different refugee groups can contribute to different 
conceptions of how to build or re-build citizenship (Clark 2007). The success and 
sustainability of post-conflict reconstruction policies will depend greatly on the meaningful 
participation of these groups in decision- and policy-making processes. 
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3.1.2 Market recovery programmes 
Post-conflict policies must create mechanisms to support those that suffered the greatest 
welfare losses, generate sustainable income generation processes, strengthen property 
rights and regulate (and in many circumstances, rebuild) credit and insurance markets. The 
reconstruction of former and the support of new processes of income generation are 
fundamental to bringing household affected by armed conflict into sustainable paths of 
recovery and to remove households from poverty traps. One example is the establishment of 
cooperative arrangements amongst communities (see Wood 2003 for El Salvador). Of key 
importance for the reconstruction of household welfare is the generation of employment 
opportunities and enhancement of the productive capacity of households that lost productive 
members (such as those led by widows) and households that need to rebuild themselves 
once ex-fighters (including children) are demobilised and refugees return to original 
communities. This requires a strong focus of post-conflict reconstruction policies in 
guaranteeing the well-functioning of property rights and of credit and financial institutions. 
 
Economic analysis have shown extensively how well-defined property rights influence 
significantly the potential for economic growth in any given country through investment 
incentives (resulting from larger certainty in future returns to capital and labour), increased 
credit market access and increased land productivity (see Soto 2000; Deininger 2003). The 
role of property rights in both the onset of armed conflict and in the post-conflict period is less 
well-understood.  
 
Accounts of recent civil wars have put land appropriation at the heart of the main motives for 
the onset of violence (see discussion in Brockett 1990; Wood 2003 and Verwimp 2005). 
Access to land is important for both rebel groups and state actors as it provides territorial 
control of populations and resources. For instance, massacres in Colombia often take place 
in order to terrorize the population into facilitating the appropriation of land titles. Therefore, 
weak institutions may facilitate the appropriation of land titles, open opportunities for the 
capture of resources and ease the displacement of households and communities. Velasquez 
(2007) shows that in Colombia the introduction of greater formality of property rights leads to 
an immediate increase in attacks by armed groups; but it reaches a point where the greater 
formality dissuades the presence of armed actors. This is because legality over land plots 
hinders military strategies of appropriation by armed actors, therefore deterring military 
attacks and decreasing the intensity of the conflict. In contrast, Velasquez’s statistical 
analysis shows that the informality of property rights in key areas of combat in Colombia has 
influenced positively the decision to attach by armed groups, as well as the intensity of the 
attacks. Evidence-based research in still incipient but results show strongly that the 
implementation and strengthening of institutions that guarantee the formalization of land titles 
is crucial to the establishment of sustainable peace in post-conflict periods (see Ibanez and 
Moya 2005; Velasquez 2007).  
 
But strengthening property rights is not a liner process that results inevitably in lower conflict. 
In a recent study, Butler and Gates (2007) show that simply increasing property rights 
without addressing equity issues can in fact increase the level of conflict in society, since it 
may add to existing grievances. Successful efforts to strength property rights in post-conflict 
settings must comply with issues of fairness and equity in order to address potential bias that 
either existed or may arise in property titles (for instance, granting land titles to small farmers 
that work the land but do not hold formal titles). This finding has significant implications for 
international organizations and peace treaties that encourage state governments to focus on 
strengthening property rights institutions without addressing central issues of equity, fairness 
and social justice (see Butler and Gates 2007).  
 
In addition to property rights, market recovery programmes must also address the challenge 
of rebuilding credit and other financial markets. A large literature has shown the importance 
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of access to credit for households in developing countries and how credit constraints hinder 
development and contribute to the establishment of pockets of structural long-term poverty. 
Building credit market recovery into post-conflict policies to support incipient forms of 
economic activity is therefore of key significance to lift households affected by armed conflict 
from potential poverty traps and to avoid further marginalisation of excluded groups. 
Microfinance services, including savings, credit and insurance facilities, have been used in 
specific circumstances to address the economic security of households in the post-conflict 
period, support the return to farming of rural populations that may not have access to the 
formal financial sector (which may itself have been destroyed by the conflict) and aid the 
reconstruction of key financial institutions and capital and insurance markets at the 
community level. Venkatachalam (2006) shows evidence for the success of these policies in 
the period after the civil war in Tajikistan. The main findings of this research show that 
microfinance services have generated significant additional business income that enabled 
household members (particularly women) to spend more on meeting the basic needs of their 
household. Household-level post-conflict policies must consider the central role that this and 
other financial instruments can play in reconstructing livelihoods and spurring economic 
activity. 
 
One of those additional instruments is remittances. Remittances can play a crucial role in 
rebuilding credit and other financial markets. The international community has paid 
enormous attention to limiting international income transfers in order to limit the funding of 
armed groups or terrorist groups by Diaspora. However, income or in-kind transfers from 
migrant, refugee or asylum-seeking populations may play a significant role in helping 
populations in post-conflict settings rebuilding their livelihoods and recovering their pre-war 
consumption levels, as well as moving out of poverty trap courses. Although the international 
community has focussed on the role of aid in rebuilding livelihoods, the role of remittances 
should not be overlooked.  
 
It is clear that in many circumstances remittances are channelled towards supporting specific 
political and developmental agendas (see Lindley 2007 for Somalia). However, the 
establishing appropriate institutions to encourage the channelling of remittances to social 
services, the rebuilding of household capital (physical and human) and infrastructure 
rebuilding may overcome other social and political constraints, may stimulate local credit and 
financial markets (when remittances are channelled through local banking systems) and may 
even allow access to new employment opportunities by those release from farm work, as 
well as encourage the creation of new jobs through the establishment of new economic 
activities.  
 
3.2 Household-level assistance policies 
 
The standard approach to the provision of assistance to countries in conflict has been to 
focus on humanitarian assistance and emergency relief, while less effort has been put into 
more developmental approaches. In particular, the potential use of compensatory policies, 
including social protection policies and safety nets has been largely ignored in post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes. Justino (2006a), using state-level empirical evidence for India, 
shows that in the medium-term (i.e. over a period of five years), public expenditure on social 
services and improvements in education enrolments are effective means to reduce civil 
unrest and prevent the outbreak of violence, as they affect directly the level of poverty across 
Indian states. But little evidence exists on the role of social protection policies in re-
establishing livelihoods and social cohesion in post-conflict settings. 
 
The role of social protection policies and safety nets in supporting household welfare in 
stressful circumstances is well-known. Safety nets can be effective in lifting trapped 
households out of poverty, in particular those with enough capacity to accumulate assets but 
that were pushed into poverty by several factors including the direct effects of armed conflict 
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(such as displacement, death of household members, and so forth). Their pre-conflict welfare 
could potentially be recovered by well designed net asset transfer schemes. These can be 
combined with productive safety net policies to prevent them from falling below the poverty 
trap threshold (see Barrett and Carter 2006).  
 
This of course raises less than comfortable questions on how best to support government 
social interventions when budgets are depleted, organisational infrastructure is weaken or 
inexistent and state government must compete in many areas of dispute with organisational 
arrangements established by rebel groups amongst communities that they controlled during 
the conflict. This is an important though neglected area of focus for post-conflict policies as 
household insecurity and competition for local governance in the supply of local public goods 
may well influence the sustainability of peace and the strength of potential for further 
rebellion in the future.  
 
 
4  Final reflections and future research 
 
This paper proposed a conceptual framework to understand the endogenous nature of 
armed conflict processes at the household level. The paper discusses important transmission 
mechanisms from armed conflict to household welfare, as well as changes in the economic, 
social and political behaviour of households directly and indirectly affected by the processes 
of violence generated by armed conflict. These mechanisms were substantiated by recent 
empirical findings. However, despite this welcoming surge in empirical evidence on micro-
level processes of violent conflict, we still lack considerable evidence on fundamental 
processes linking armed civil conflict and household welfare. Effective analysis and 
refinement of the mechanisms outlined in this paper requires serious advances in existing 
knowledge on micro-level processes resulting from armed conflict. First, we require great 
theoretical efforts in linking existing evidence and literature on sociological, economic and 
political aspects underlying collective action, with the analysis of psychological categories of 
real actors of armed conflict and their preferences, including issues of group identity and 
perception, which under certain circumstances may trigger violence. The ability to map how 
different categories of individuals and households (and groups) participate and/or are 
affected by different processes of armed conflicts and the violence generation processes 
during and after the conflict, and how norms and behaviours that determine relationships 
between and within communities are shaped by the conflict, would be useful exercises in 
ensuring that conflict-related policies are adequately tailored to the needs and demands of 
different groups affected by violence. The second requirement for further advances in this 
area of research is the development of new databases and new and more appropriate 
methodologies for the empirical analysis of processes of armed conflict at the micro level. 
One of the main challenges to understanding conflict from a household level perspective is 
the absence of adequate datasets. This partially results from the focus of traditional security 
studies on the state and state agency. There are also a number of difficulties associated with 
the collection of data in conflict areas, not least of which are the destruction associated with 
violence and potential ethical and security challenges to research in areas of conflict. Micro-
level data analyses of conflict contexts face additional methodological challenges, such as 
selection effects, the fact that conflict events tend to be highly clustered geographically, the 
fact that many of the occurrences or types of actors that conflict surveys will want to focus on 
may be in very small numbers and difficulties in linking the objects of surveys with contextual 
information.9 Further advances in the micro level empirics of armed conflict would allow more 
precise identification of factors leading to the success or failure of conflict recovery (and even 
prevention) measures and their impact on household welfare. We expect the framework 
                                                 
9  There are already a number of useful surveys that can be adapted and new surveys are being collected. For details see 
www.hicn.org and www.microconflict.eu. 
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proposed in this paper to act as a benchmark for further work on the analysis of the 
relationship between armed conflict and household welfare, including much-needed efforts at 
gathering further empirical evidence. 
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